Term Limits

The Negative Consequences of Term Limits? I Don't See Them.

I am increasingly intrigued by the idea of term limits for City Council, brought to a head by Councilman Goode's bill.

I think that there are reasonable arguments to made against them, and that people can disagree, but, at this point, none of the reasons against them on the Philadelphia level are large enough for me to consider the idea anything but very good. Before addressing why I think they are good, let’s start by analyzing why they are potentially bad. I will take them one by one, mostly culled from people in the post below.

1) They are un-democratic, because they take away voter choice.

“When the people are limited in who they can choose to hold office, democracy is limited.”

The biggest problem with this argument is that we limit democratic choices all of the time. We have a representative democracy, which limits our choice, and within that representative democracy, we make all kinds of other choices. On the national level, that means only voting for US Citizens for President, voting age limits, etc. And, on the local and national level, that means term limits for the executive.

We do this all of the time. The question for me is not whether or not it checks some invisible box as less or more democratic, apparently defined as having the most choice possible, but if it furthers the function of a democratic government in our city. We can argue about the potential reward of these things, but, simply saying “it limits democracy” doesn’t make sense. Especially when this would be voted on by the electorate, and overwhelmingly approved.

2) They give more power to the Mayor, in a strong Mayor system, and lessen the power of city council to work together.

Maybe. How do we really know that? It is possible that Councilpeople less worried about getting on the Mayor’s bad side will be more likely to cross him or her? Our three newest Council people quickly formed a block together, and they have brought new ideas to a head even while they just began. And, if the library fight is an example, then the two Council people who most helped were new- Councilwoman Q-S and Councilman Green. In fact, Council's long term members were for the most part excruciatingly quiet on the issue.

3) They give more power to corporations, lobbyists and bureaucrats.

This is one of the most persuasive reasons to not have limits on a national level. Because while a Congressman might go home, oftentimes, his staff does not, and simply becomes new staff or new lobbyists. It feeds on a DC culture that gives a lot of power to corporations and lobbyists, and Washington-based bureaucrats, rather than representatives and staffers based in their home districts.

But, is that a danger in Philly? I don’t think so. The big money people here are the Comcasts of the world, the Chamber of Commerce and its affiliates, Unions and Law Firms. Much of that will not change. The scale of money in our political system is much, much smaller, and focuses largely on keeping incumbents in office (like developers paying large donations to their district council people, who have to sign off on everything).

And, more simply put, we all live here. People will take office with staffers with whom they are comfortable. It won’t be about choosing staff willing to move across statelines to live in DC; it will be about finding staff who are comfortable taking the subway to work.

4) Nothing will change.

Even if we term limit the incumbents, until we have deeper reforms, their replacement aren't going to be cut from a different mold.

Maybe. Even if true, that is not necessarily a bad thing; more a sad reality. But, I am not sure it is true. Open seats lead to more competition, and I think, would lead to more insurgents getting elected. That is just a personal opinion, but, its not exactly a stretch to say that part of the reason Curtis Jones and Maria Q-S won is that they were running in essentially open seats.

5) The lame duck problem

Do we really want the odious problem of political lame ducks invading the legislative level -- people in government who no longer feel the pull of the ballot box in their decision-making, and who are thus less likely to listen to the electorate?

Again, I don’t know how you prove this. Isn’t also likely that if people are dependent on campaign contributions, they will be less likely to do things based on those contributions when they no longer need them?

As for a revolving door between the private sector, which I do think is a legit concern, what about some sort of additional law that, like that which the White House talks about, which would make you wait a few years before you can work for a company lobbying Council, or something like that?

But, again:

Experience bears out that lame ducks listen to the electorate less, even less, in my opinion, than do long-term incumbents.

… that might be true. But, I haven’t really seen concrete evidence of that. I’m not saying it might not be true, but, I really don’t know how you quantify lame-duck versus entrenched incumbent.

6) No more “Lions of the Council,” like David Cohen.

That is a concern. But, for every great Councilperson who stays, there are many who should not. And, in any case, David Cohen left City Council and then returned. Here too, someone could do that, with a one-term break. I don’t think it is really that terrible of a concern, when someone could potentially serve on City Council for 24 out of 28 years.

Anyway, that is my take. The negative arguments just don't feel that strong to me.

Larry Frankel on Term Limits

Shortly before his promotion to the national office of the American Civil Liberties Union, Larry Frankel,Legislative Director of the ACLU for Pennsylvania, testified before the Speaker's Commission on Legislative Reform, on which I served, on April 26,2007. Here's what he said about term limits:

"The ACLU does not support efforts aimed at reducing the size of the legislature or setting term limits. We believe that both of these "reforms" are misguided attempts that would only result in a loss of wisdom, expertise and years of institutional memory by forcing legislators out of office even though the voters have not ousted them.

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